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SUMMARY 
Information presented tc a decision maker for interpretation 
may be in at least two forms: cues - multiple indicators of the state 
of some underlying variable or construct; and components - representa-
tive separable dimensions of the entity about which a decision is to 
be made. Generally, the information is presented as a mixed set of 
these forms; this implies a requirement for a two-stage processing 
strategy, separating the estimation and evaluation phases. If the 
decision maker is able to apply an appropriate set of task-structuring 
constructs in an orderly manner, he should be able to reduce both his 
estimation error and the information-processing demands of the task. 
This research investigated the effects on performance, in such 
tasks, of suggesting, and forcing, an appropriate conceptual structure. 
The central model was Brunswik's Lens Model, while the conceptual !Struc-
ture was suggested, and imposed, by means of a verbal problem context. 
The outcome of the study contributed to understanding the impact of con-
ceptual structures on successful problem solving, particularly by its 
attempt to bridge the gap between the slow learning of laboratory experi-




Shadows on the Wall of the Cave 
Historical Perspective  
Egon Brunswik, in 1956, published a most significant theory 
concerning the means of studying how man does his mental work. 
Brunswik was the first to notice that task modelling was different 
from people modelling. Moreover, he devised a task modelling tool 
that linked tasks and people (Edwards, 1971). His original work has 
been modified and enhanced by Brunswik himself, and by a great many 
other people, most notably by Kenneth R. Hammond, working with various 
other researchers. Hammond, the director of the Research Program on 
Human Judgment and Social Interaction, Institute of Behavioral Science 
at the University of Colorado, is perhaps the principal advocate of 
Brunswik's work. Let us then examine this task modelling tool which 
allows one to separate out the environmental elements' contributions to 
a judge's achievement (Hammond, 1966). 
Brunswik's Lens Model 
The central postulate of Brunswik's work is that our knowledge 
of our environment is acquired in the face of uncertainty. For example, 
his original research on perception stressed that human attainment of a 
percept, such as the distance of an object, is based on a number of 
error-prone indicators (or cues) such as apparent size, brightness, 
1 
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perspective information, and so on. Each cue is, on its own, unrelia-
ble to some extent, although each is related to the environmental state 
being perceived. Successful performance in such situations thus requires 
the individual to process a number of unreliable cues into a sinale (and 
more reliable) percept. Subsequent extensions of this underlying idea 
include clinical judgment situations such as Rorschach test interpreta-
tion (Hammond, 1955), estimates of student grade averages (Hammond, 
Hursch, and Todd, 1964), and use of geometric cues to predict a numeri-
cal criterion (Todd and Hammond, 1965). 
The Brunswik approach to such situations treats simultaneously: 
(a) a set of relationships between a distal variable and a set of 
informational cues; and (b) a set of relationships between these cues 
and the subject's response. The model provides a framework in which 
the subject (or inferring organism) is placed in a structured rela-
tionship with the ecology, thus providing a basis for the study of 
complex human inferential situations (Yntema and Torgerson, 1961). 
This set of relationships is portrayed in Figure 1. 
Definitions 
Y
e is the established (true) value of the distal variable on 
the ecology side of the model. This is the variable which the subjct 
will estimate. Note that it may be extremely difficult, or even impos-
sible, to gain access to the value of Y e . 
[x] is a set of cues, or multiple indicators of the underlying 
distal variable. 
Y








Figure 1. Brunswik's Lens Model. 
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Ye 
is the best linear prediction of the distal variable based 
on the multiple indicators [x i ] of that variable. 
Y
s 
is the best linear prediction of the subject's response, 
based on the cues. 
r ie is the simple product-moment correlation between the value 
of the i th cue and the true value of the distal variable. It is called 
the ecological validity of the i th cue, since it is calculated for the 
ecology side of the model. 
r is
, the simple product-moment correlation between the value of 
the ith cue and the subject's response, is called the subject's utili-
zation coefficient for the i th cue. 
r a , the simple product-moment correlation between the distal 
variable and the subject's response, is referred to as the achievement 
index, since it provides a measure of the subject's success in his esti-
mating task. 
R
e , the multiple correlation between the distal variable and 
its best linear prediction, measures the linear predictability of the 
distal variable from the cues. In laboratory tasks, 	may be .pre- 
determined. 
R
s is the multiple correlation between the subject's responSe 
and its best linear prediction, on the subject side of the model. When 
limited to laboratory tasks, Hammond and Summers (1972) have definld 
R
s 
to be the cognitive control that the subject exerts over the use of 
his knowledge. 
G is the multiple correlation coefficient between the best linear 
prediction of the distal variable, and the best linear prediction of the 
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distal variabley and the best linear prediction of the response v a ri-
able. it is called the matching index and measures the knowledge that 
the subject has obtained about the task properties (Hammond and Summers, 
1972). 
By definition, the task uncertainty measurement, R e , sets the 
limit to achievement of any simple linear model, reached only if the 
subject has exact knowledge of the task structure and perfect cognitive 
control. As Hammond and Summers (1972) state: 
R s is statistically independent of G. Such independence 
is critical, for it means that even should G reach unity 
(indicating perfect knowledge), if R s were less than unity 
(indicating imperfect control), performance would be less 
than the limit of achievement (R ) would permit. Gonverse1i,y, 
R might equal 1.00, thus indicating that the perfectly 
controlled cognitive system was not appropriate to the task 
system, thus preventing achievement r a from reaching its 
upper limit R e . 
Two subjects, therefore, might have identical achieve- 
ment indexes for different reasons; one because of perfect 
knowledge (G = 1.00) but imperfect control (R, < 1.00), and 
the other because of perfect control (R s = 1.60), but imper-
fect knowledge (G < 1.00). Variations between these extremes 
could also occur, of course. 
C is the simple product moment correlation between the non - linear 
	
residuals of Y
ee ) and the non-linear residuals of Y s 	). s 
L. G. Tucker's 1964 paper presented an elegant alternative formu-
lation to the important work of Hursch, Hammond, and Hursch (1964),, and 
Hammond, Hursch, and Todd (1964). This formulation linked together the 
various elements defined above in a clear, concise manner. Tuckeii 
assumed that all variables were standardized, and that Ye had a normal 
underlyind distribution. He defined b. and t as the residual errors of 












From multiple linear regression theory, 





so that, from (1): 
Var (b e ) = 1 -R e2 , and 
Var' (?,,$) = 1 -R s2 . 
Thus: 
A 0`. 
r = Cov(Y Y ) = Cov(Y) 	Cov( 6 ). 
a e s 	es  
Substitution into equation (4) yields: 
	
r =Gk h + C(1 - R ) (1 - R 2 	. a 	e 	 e 	s 
Observe that v,Hen any of the following o:, - cur: 	(a) coonitive 
control reaches one; (b) the linear predictibility aces to one; or 
when (c) C reaches zero, the right hand portion of equation (5) 








Therefore, Tucker has shown that under any of these restrictions, the 
achievement correlation is a function of the knowledge the subject has 







system, and the extent tc which the nonlinear variance elements 4 
the ecology side of the model are correlated with the non-linear 
lance elements of the subject side of the model (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
1971). 
Empirical Studies 
The Brunswik model provides an excellent model for research, 
some of the results of which might be used to program a machine to aid 
a decision maker. After all, a machine is consistent, and does not 
suffer from fatigue or prejudice. Clearly, a machine programmed with 
a simple linear model will at least equal a man's performance in tasks 
for which such a model is optimal. 
Man, however, has been thought of as a superior decision maker 
because of some expectation of non-linear or configural skills. DT B. 
Yntema and bb. S. Torgerson (1961), suggested that consistent use of a 
simple linear model resulted in better judgments than when humans had 
free reign in arriving at a judgment, to include the ability to con-
sider non-linearities in the situation (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971), 
L. W. Dudycha and J. C. Naylor (1966) went even further. They 
observed that their subjects, working on complex-structured multiple 
cue inferential tasks, were assigning proper weights to the cues, but 
were causing inaccuracies due to their inconsistencies, They concluded 
that, once the judgment pattern had been established by the subjects, 
the subjects should allow "the strategy to persist unaltered (Slovic, and 
Lichtenstein, 1971). In fact, Dawes (1971, 1972) later arcl0ed•th4 any 
-linear model will, on the average, out-perform subjects, Other studies 
have been conducted by Yntema, Torgerson and Lee (1961) and Raiffa'(1970). 
With an observation that certainly resembles solid experimental 
design, Hoffman (1960) noticed that statistical difficulties present] 
themselves when the search for configural information use is made 
after conducting the experiment. Green (in Slavic and Lichtenstein,!: 
 1971) agreed and suggested that the first step be to advance the 
hypothesis of non-linear behavior, and then search for support for it. 
Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971, found that differences in subjects' com-
bination strategies were a function of whether two cues were in conflict 
or not. When both the cues were congruent, the subjects used both. 
When they were not, the subjects discounted one or the other or both, 
and turned to other information. Slovic's work as well as experiments 
by Hoffman (1960) and Anderson and Jacobson (1966) show that the linear 
model may need a term to account for the level of incompatibility among 
the cues. 
In the modern world, decisions have become more necessary, more 
frequent, and more important than ever before. Ancient man had little 
to do but keep himself and his family alive. Life was remarkably simple 
then, albeit brutal. Technology has changed that; individual men now 
effect decisions that affect not only themselves and their families, 
but hundreds or millions of others. 
The aftermath of a bad decision is usually to complain that not 
enough accurate information was available at the time the decision had 
to be made. Often, however, the problem is not that the information 
was not available, but that it had to be sorted, interpreted and inte-
grated with other items of information to provide a proper base forl 
decision (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). 
the 
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One must find some way of solving this problem, and judging by 
the way the world keeps moving along, human beings have become very 
proficient at it 	However, when an attempt is made to find out juSt 
how this is done, the issue becomes exceedingly complex. Aithoughb 
people have the facility for solving real life problems, and are dging 
a good job at it, attempts to present laboratory problems under con- 
trolled conditions meet with little successful comprehension by the sub-
jects (Hammond and Summers, 1972). For example, some of Brehmer's 
(1973) subjects labored over 360 trials of line estimation, only to 
have their performance rating equal little better than chance. 
The poor performance in a laboratory setting alluded to above, 
is often explained away by saying that the subject did not fully under-
stand what he was to do. One can, however, using the correlations and 
formulas described above, discover the individual's level of knowledge 
and of control, and show (as was discussed on page 5) that perfect H  
knowledge cannot guarantee perfect achievement, when there is imperfect 
cognitive control Hammond and Summers (1972). 
The Lens Model Re•examined 
Thus far, this paper has presented the fundamental concepts 
of Brunswik's Lens Model, its statistical developments, and some illus-
trative research sugoesting the power or the approach to understanding 
complex judgment and decision making skills. The remainder of this 
chapter will re-examine these ideas from a slightly different perspec-
tive, with a view to identifying the research question investigated in 
the empirical part of this study. 
10 
The lens model may be usefully considered as two interacting 
11) ,is ems% 	a task subsystem, consisting of the relationships between 
the distal variable and the cues, and a response subsystem, consisting 
if the relationships between the cues and the subject's response. (Prom 
this viewpoint, successful performance requires the subject to mak* some 
appropriate matching between the characteristics of his response sub-
system and those of the task subsystem. As Hoffman (1960) notes, iso-
morphism between the two subsystems is not necessary for good perform-
ances paramorphism will suffice. 
In this view, then, the subject's task is to use whatever 
information he has available to adjust his response subsystem so as 
to match the characteristics of the task subsystem. The bulk of the 
reported laboratory research has provided the subject only with "out-
come feedback" (e.g.: Hammond and Summers (1972); Dudycha and Naylor 
1966a) to assist him in this "tuning," though recent work by Hammond 
and others (Sorensen (1967); Newton (1965); Todd and Hammond 1965)6 
has shown the advantages of providing the subject with more detailed 
information on characteristics of either task or response subsystems, 
or both. Other types of information which would allow such "tuning" 
have not apparently, been systematically studied. Two exceptions are 
a study by Miklausich (1973) demonstrating the detrimental effects of 
error introduced into outcome feedback on the accuracy with which sub- 
jects can match a given task subsystem; and a study by Rose (in progress) 
of the effects of evaluation feedback on such matching, The present 
study will examine the effects of providing the subject with a verbal 
context implying the structure of the task subsystem. 
LI 
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A previously neglected aspect of the verbal context which will 
be considered here was proposed by Miller (1971). He was concerned with 
whether the name put on the cue was congruent with the values of the 
ecologicalcorrelations(r
ie
)or inconaruent with them. He also raised 
the question of how feedback of the true values of the distal varible 
r! , 1 
might interact with the cue labels. Miller had clinicians, statisticians, 
freshman math-oriented students, and other freshman students predict 
examination results, given three pieces of information. In one of the 
nine testing conditions, cues were labeled with what they actually rep-
resented; in the other eight they were either falsely labeled or not 
labeled at all. Except for the practicina statisticians, the subjects 
did worse when the conditions logically conflicted with the task subsystem 
correlations (which they were given). 
One area for extension of the existing research, then, is the 
examination of modes other than outcome or lens model feedback to allow 
the subject to tune. A second extension is the range of task properties 
considered. It appears that Brunswik's original form' iation (1956 
the Lens Model was in terms of a single underlying variable type of task, 
in which the cues serve as a set of indicators of the value of the 
underlyina variable. Much of the subsequent laboratory work, however, 
has examined a rather different task subsystem, in which a set of orthoao 
nal cue values determines the distal variable value either in a linear 
relationship, (e.a., Dawes (1971); Hammond, Hursch, and Todd (196 4 )), or 
a non-linear relationship, (e.g. Summers and Hammond (1966); Brehmer 
(1969)). Connolly (1973) argues that such procedures are inconsistent 
with Brunswik's formulations, and proposes a distinction between cue-typE 
12 
problems for the single underlying variable case, and component type 
problems for the other cases. 
Without developing Connolly's argument here in detail, it dbes 
appear of value to consider problem subsystems other than those in 
which there is a direct relationship between cues and distal variables. 
Of particular interest are what might be called complex structUred i prob-
lems in which there is at least one level of intermediate constructs 
between distal and cue variables. A simple example would be the esti-
mation of the distal variable "area" where the entire cue set would be 
partitioned into a subset relating to "width" and a second relating to 
"length." In such a case, one would expect the within-subset correla-
tions to be fairly high, while the between- subset correlations could 
appropriately be made equal to zero. 
The interest of such complex structures problems is two-fold. 
First, they appear to represent a range of complex real-world problems 
more closely than do the simple structured tasks oenerally used in , labo-
ratory studies. Second, they require the subject to adopt a two-Staoe 
information-processino strategy to achieve the highest possible per-
formance, This suaaests that insight into the task structure would be 
an important determinant of performance - an insight which may be 
readily provided by means of a suitable verbal context, as discussed 
earlier. 
In summary, the present research is intended to advance the 
domain the domain of laboratory studies in two areas. First, the task 
subsystem will be complex-structured. Second, the subject will be 
provided with a verbal context suggesting the structure of the task 
13 
subsystem, as well as the usual outcome feedback. 
An underlying question which is not often discussed in the liter- 
ature is that subjects seem to learn number puzzles in the laboratOry 
very slowly, and yet appear able to handle successfully the real-world 
learning of highly complex problems. This study will check to see 'if 
the verbal construct idea bridges this gap in learning perforMancef, 
The research question of interest may be summarized as follows: 
Research guestion 
"What are the effects on learning and performance in a complex 
structured inference task of suggesting, and of imposing, an appropriate 
conceptual structure?" 
The approach taken will be a three-group design. All three 
groups will work numerically identical problems, under conditions of 
no structuring insight, suggested structuring insight, and imposed 




s in a complex - structured multiple cue inference task, sU h 
 jects provided with a task-structuring insight will outperform subj 
not provided with such insight. 
fi.„
2 : 	In a complex-structured multiple cue inference task, sub- 
iects forced to use the task-structuring insic) It will outperform those 
who have had such insight merely suggested to them. 
The null hypothesis. in each case, is that the performance fails 
be sionificantly superior. 
The term complex - structured. as used above, indicates a problem 
in n which the cues and groups of cues are presented in such a mann 
14 
that the decision maker can apply some task-structuring constructs to 
reduce the demands of the task. The detailed experimental design and 





The primary feature of a well-designed experiment is a direct., 
path - starting with the information desired, and working backward 
to the proper construction of an experiment to get this information . 
To test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1, it was necessary 
to design a complex-structured problem with three treatments, corre-
sponding to the three groups of subjects. Group 1 received the basic 
verbal context; its purpose was to orient the subject and arouse his 
interest in the problem. Group 11 received both the basic context, 
and a structuring context which implied the existence of intermediate 
constructs. Group 111 received all the information given the Group 
subjects, but were, in addition, asked to record their estimates of the 
intermediate constructs, as well as their overall estimates. 
Verbal  Contexts 
The basic verbal context was common to all three groups; and 
was the only information available to Group I. This basic context 
placed the subject in the position of the personnel director for a 
large corporation, responsible for the acceptance or rejection of job 
applicants. In an effort to do a good job for the corporation, the 
personnel director (subject) wanted to devise an efficiency score pre-
diction scheme usino only four expert ratings for each applicant 
lb 
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(provided by consultants to the corporation). The context explained 
that an assistant had gone into the corporation files and pulled out 
a sample of efficiency scores of current employees, as well as the 
expert ratings given at the time they were hired. Thus the basic 
procedure was for the subjects to take four cues (labeled Expert A, 
etc.), make their response (efficiency score prediction), and then be 
given feedback (the actual current efficiency score from the files). 
The context was specifically designed to exclude any requirement for 
expertise in any specific field. 
Group ii was given a structuring verbal context in addition 
to the basic context. These subjects were told that two of the four] 
expert ratings were by psychologists, and that the other two were by 
successful businessmen. The cues were relabeled PSY 1,2 and BUS 1,2. 
Thus intermediate constructs (overall psychological rating and overall 
business rating) were implied. 
Group III subjects were given all the information above, and 
then were told to actually estimate and write down the overall psycho- 
logical and business ratings as well as their predicted efficiency scores. 
Obviously, this actually forced the subjects in Group Iii to use (or, at 
least note the presence of) intermediate constructs. 
in summary then, each group of subjects worked a numerically 
identical problem (within each phase). The difference in treatment was 
that Group I received no insight into the structure of the problem, Group 
11 had the structure implied, while Group 111 had the structure imposed. 
Test Generation,. 
Given the sensitivity of many Lens Model phenomena to slight 
7 
variations in problem characteristics (see, for example, Miklausich. 
1973) it was decided to investigate two different versions (phases) of 
an essentially identical problem. The problem used throughout was a 
two -component, four - cue problem in which the distal variable ("effi-
ciency score') was calculated as the product of two components ("psycho-
logical rating," P, and "business rating," B. Each component had two 
associated cues. The structure of the problem is shown in Figure 2. 
As may be seen, the problem is "complex-structured"in the sense dis- 
cussed earlier. 
For Phase A, the two (1 X60) component matrices, named P and 61' 
were generated from a normal distribution with mean = 5, and variance 
- 4; this provided a range (within two standard deviations) of 1 to 9. 
The scale was truncated at 1 and 9 to eliminate unreal values (in par- 
ticular, the multiplication by zero in arriving at the distal variable). 
These matrices were then manipulated to provide the your cues (expert 
ratings), by adding induced error into the component array. The 
(4. X60) error matrix was generated using a normal distribution with 
mean = 0 and variance . 1. The error scale was truncated at -1 and +1 
(one standard deviation). 
The Cue Matrix was generated according to the following 
formulae: 
11. 
P 1,i . P i  4- E 1,i 	. 1,...,60 
P 	= P + E 
	
2,1 i 	2,i ' 
. 	, B 	f£ 	j 	1...,60 
1.J 3,j 
, 
B. = B, 	E 
„I 4 ,j 









P, B – N(5,4) 
P 1 9— " P 60 ) 





E – N(0,1) 






1 	4,60 r Generate Cue Matrix 
Figure 3. Test Generation Flow Diagram, Phase A. 
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 , so as to avoid the intimation of the common origins of 
the P cues, and B cues, by their juxtaposition. 
The same two-component, four cue task was used for both phases 
A and B, with Y e 
equal to the product of the components in each case. 
In Phase A, the distribution of Y
e 
values followed that suqqestd by 
the histogram shown in the Appendix. In Phase B, the distribu t ion of 
Y
e 
was approximately uniform across the -.canoe 1 to 60. For the sample 
of trials used, Phase A had an R e value of 0.94, Phase B of 0.96. From 
the subjects' viewpoint, the major difference between Phase A and Phase 
B was expected to be increased frequency of extreme Ye values in the! 
latter. Since extreme values are probably highly diagnostic of problem 
structure, performance in Phase B was expected to exceed that in Phase A. 
EckqEment and Materials 
An overhead projector was fitted with a roll of acetate which ran 
over a mounted transparency. The transparency displayed the headings 
appropriate to the subject croup, e.g., for Group Is 
ACTUAL 
EMPLO'iEE 	EXPERT 	EXPERT 	EXPERT 	EXPERT 	EFFiCIENCY 
NUMBER A B C D SCORE 
The cues and distal variable sets were written on the acetate 
roll, and were then rolled over the transparency. The actual efficiOpcy 
H 
score was covered by a card until the subjects had responded.• 
The answer booklet used by the subjects was reproduced by the 
XEROX copier, and was stapled together. The subjects were instructed. 
to pull out the staple, and to manipulate the individual canes of the 
20 
booklet in any way they saw fit. 
Subjects 
The members of the subject pool were unpaid juniors, seniors 
and graduate students attending the Georgia Institute of Technology, 
Each member of the pool was assigned to a phase, and to a particular 
group (five subjects per cell), solely on the basis of his random 
arrival at the testing site. 
Procedure 
The subject groups were physically separated while the test 
instructions were oiven, and during the test itself, so that no member 
of one group could hear and compare the instructions being given to ll  
I. 
another group. 
Each group was established in a comfortable room in standard: 
institutional furniture. An effort was made to make the test site and 
all materials to appear neat, clean, and orderly - so that each subject 
would feel that he was working with a substantial investigation, and was 
not wasting his time by taking the test. 
The groups were seated. and each subject was asked if he could 
see the projection screen clearly. When all were settled, the scenario 
cthe appropriate verbal contexts) was read carefully and distinctly, 
with a request for questions after its reading. immediately following, 
four examples were considered. The example data sets were shown orqthe 
projection screen, as well as on an example sheet in the subject's 
Iii 
answer booklet. The subjects were told to tear out their example sheet 
21 
and keep it handy to their work area. Additionally, the several key , r 
 points from the scenario (including the cue and response scales), 
printed at the top of the example sheet, were read aloud. 
After answering all questions about the scenario and examples, 
the test data sets of four cues were shown, and read aloud, one set at 
a time. After all the subjects had written down their predictions for 
each four cue set, and had so indicated by looking up from their work, 
the "Actual Efficiency Score" (distal variable feedback) for that set 
was uncovered by the monitor, and shown to, read aloud to, and recorded 
by the subjects. 
The data sets were shown sequentially until all 60 test data sets 
had been covered. The subjects in each group were given two one-minute 
breaks between each block of twenty test data sets to review their 
work, and to modify their approaches if they desired. 
Therefore there were established, for each phase, three groups 
which corresponded to the three levels of information (insight) described 
above. The subtle change between the phases of the experiment is caused 
solely by the source of the numbers that were used by the subjects. 
That is, the undelyino distribution of Phase A numbers was normal, 
while that of Phase B numbers was uniform. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Primary_Analisis 
As explained previously, the experiment consisted of two phaSes. 
The only difference between phases was that Phase A had a normal under-
lying distribution, while Phase B's distribution was uniform. 
The cues and distal variables for both phases, with their asso-
ciated subject responses, were processed through routines of the Univac 




, and then the CORAN routine was used for the correlations 
r a , R e' 
R
s
, and G. Prior to further analysis, the correlations were 
transformed to Fisher's z values, since the distribution of the z values 
is approximately normal. The transformation allowed averaging and 
analysis of the variance. See McNemar (1969) for further discussio 
Fisher's transformation. 
The experimental task of Phase A was performed by the three 
groups of subjects, corresponding to the three treatment levels defined 
by the verbal context (insights). Since the hypotheses concerned the 
improvement in performance between groups, the statistic r a was plotted 
(Figure 4). The value of the limit of achievement, and the knowledge 
about the properties of the task were also plotted to help with inter-
pretation. The data provide weak support (p < 0.10) for Hypothesis 2: 





















H i : Subjects provided with a task-structuring insight (Group 1I) 
will outperform subjects not provided with such insight (Group I). 
H : Subjects forced to use the task-structuring insight (Group III) 
will outperform those who have had such insight merely suggested to 
them (Group 11). 
H , . Performance fails to be significantly superior. 
Groups 
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Figure 4. Display of Results, Phase A, 
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Table 1. Results and Analysis of Phase A (R e = 0.94) 
Results 	( r a/z a ) 
Groups 
	
I 	 II 	 III 
Question 1 	 0.775/1.034 	 0.822/1.163 	 0.837/1.214 
Blocks 	2 0.901/1.488 0.688/1.413 0.935/1.696 
3 	 0.925/1.625 	 0.903/1.467 	 0.965/2.019 
ANOVA 	(on z a ) 
Source 	 5S   df 	MS 	 Ratio 
Insight 	 0.1534 	2 	0.077 	5.105 (p < 0.10) 
Ques. Blks. 	0.5156 	2 	0.250 	17:161 (p < 0.025) 
Error 	 0.0600 	4 	0.015 
Total 	 0.7290 





n2 = 6; 	
a = 0.05. 
P = 	 2 
Sig. Range 	 3.46 



















1.643 l vs 	II: -0.025 < 0.190 
Group III outperformed Group Ii; H is supported. 
Group II did not outperform Group f ; H I is not supported. 
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,tructuring insight was superior to that of the group who had the 
insight merely suggested to them. 
Phase B was identical to Phase A (with the sole exception of 
the numbers in the problem), and was purposely conducted in the same 
manner as Phase A. The raw data was coded in the same manner, and 
transformed (by Fisher's transform) in the same manner as that of 
Phase A. To check on the group performance differences, the stati . Stid 
r
a 
for each aroup (along with R 	R , and 3) was plotted (Figure 5). e s 
These data provide strong, support (p ‹. 0.005) for both of the 
hypotheses (Table 2). 
ALthough the primary analysis was most satisfactory in support-
ing the hypotheses, some additional examinations were made. Recall that 
during the administration of the experiment, the subjects were given a 
break after the twentieth question and the fourtieth question. These 
made natural divisions in the work, so that it was possible to investi-
gate three blocks of questions, and check the groups" achievement across 
the blocks. 	Thereby, it was seen if the subject's improvement in ach4',.e.ve- 
meet was caused by experience gained by taking the test, or by the 
Jerbal contexts tested. in both Phases A and B it appeared that the 
subject's performance improved by the verbal context, and not by the 
experience of taking the test. 
As another method of gettAnd at this question, a ratio, 1- A, was 
deA:ned as percent achievement, or the ratio of average achevement with 





















t Subjects provided with a task-structuring insight (Group II) 
will outperform subjects not provided with such insight (Group I). 
H
2
: Subjects forced to use the task-structuring insight (Group III) 
will outperform those who have had such insight merely suggested to 
them (Group II). 
H Q . Performance fails to be significantly superior. 
Figure 5. Display of Results, Phase B. 
Table 2. Results and Analysis of Phase B (R e = 0.96) 




Question 1 0.881/1.379 0.909/1.520 0.934/1.669 
Blocks 	2 0.929/1.654 0.946/1.794 0.969/2.079 
3 0.867/1.320 0.917/1.571 0.951/1.842 
ANOVA 	(on za ) 
Source SS df MS Ratio 
Insight 0.266 2 0.133 41.325 	(p = 0.005) 
Ques Blks 0.170 2 0.085 26.486 	(p 	= 	0.010j'. 
Error 0.013 4 0.003 
Total 0.489 8 




= 0.025; 	n2 = 6; 	o = 0.05 
2 	 3 
	





0,421 > 0.140 
111  µ11I: 0.242 > 0.133 
0.179 > 0.133 
P 
Sig Range 
Least Sig. Range 
1.450 
P'11 = 1.628 
. 1.670 
Group III outperformed Group 11; H 2 is supported. 
Group li outperformed Group 1; H I is supported. 
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increased performance is caused by the verbal context rather than 
the experience of taking the test seems justified here as well. if 
each of the iso-group lines had a common origin, but varied at their 
conclusion, a different learning experience between groups would be 
shown. However, the iso-group lines, particularly in Phase B, are 
nearly parallel; this indicated the same learning experience, with the 
percent achievement varying only among contexts. See Figures 6 and 7 
for plots of percent achievement versus question blocks. 
A variation of the percent achievement ratio provided yet 
another analysis of the data. Based on the structure of the problem 
a B and P were calculated as the average of their associated cues' 
(recall that the cues were generated from B and P, rather than the 
opposite). Then, a variable called Y: was defined as the product of 
B and P. Finally, the correlation R 	rYeYe* was calculated, and 
PA* 	ra/R e
* 
was plotted in Figures 8 and 9, for Phases A and B respec- 
tively. It is felt that this variation is more illustrative than the 
previous method, since it recognizes that the subject can actually exceed 
the Re from the conventional lens model calculations, i.e., that the 
best possible stable performance for this problem can actually exceed 
what was considered the upper limit of achievement. Not incidentally, 
this method leads one to exactly the same conclusions as above - that 
the hypotheses have been supported. 
In summary, then, the data provide fairly strong support for both 
major hypotheses, with some indications as to the mechanisms involved, 
Phase B data strongly support the hypotheses of higher achievement of 
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Question Blocks 
Figure 6. Percent Achievement Usino R , Phase A. 
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-- Group 1 
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Question Blocks 
Fioure 9. Percent Achievement Using R e , Phase B. 
Groups 






Table 3, Percent Achievement s Phase A 
Question Block 	 Re 
1 0.928 0.968 
2 0.924 0.992 
3 0.956 0,996 
0,4orall 0.938 (1.992 
Achievement Using R 
P 
Groups 
Question 1 0.785 0.832 0.848 
Blocks 2 0.908 0.895 0.942 
3 0.929 0.907 0.969 
% Achievement Using R
e 
Groups 
1 11 III 
Question 1 0.835 0.886 0.902 
Blocks 2 0.976 0.962 *1.012 
3 0.968 0.944 *1.010 
Table 4, Percent Achievement, Phase B 
Question Block 
e 
1 	 0.962 
2 0.985 
3 	 0.919 
Overall 0.963 
% AchievemeiA Using R e 
I 
Question 1 0.892 





0.9 7 5 
A Achievement Using
e 	 . 
	
Groups 	 JI! 
I 	 II 11 
Qnestion 1 	 0.916 0.945 	 0,971 
Blocks 	2 0,944 	 0.961 0,984 
 
3 	 0,943 0.998 	 *1.033  
'Note that % achievement exceeds 100% in some calculations  
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and of subjects required to use such insight over those with insight 
merely available 	Phase A data tends to confirm the latter hypothesis, 
theugh howing no evidence of the former. 
Examination of Figures 6 - 9 suggests quite strongly that super- 
] 
10T achievement here is not the result of faster learning for the in 
sight„ and forced insight groups. Rather, it appears that all groups 
learn at essentially the same rate, with the highest performing groups 
stay don with an initial advantage, and maintaininp it throuohsut the 
experiment, 
A final comment should be added on the overall difference between 
Phase A and Phase B data. Recalling that the only difference between! 
the Phases was in the underlying Y distribution, it should be noted,, 
fir sL that the phenomena identified here are sensitive to apparently . 
minor chanqso in problem characteristics, and second, that the - antic4 
pat_?d hiqher diagnosticity of the uniform distribution used in Phase 
Lc, be sord- il- 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Review of Results 
The experiment was designed to test if people, given an 
insight into the structure of a task, could use the insight to assist 
them in performing the task. The task, in this experiment, was to 
integrate cue information into the estimation of a distal variable. 
Each of the three groups of subjects was given a basic moti- 
vating verbal context; Group 1 received only that. Group Il was given 
some insight when the grouping of pairs of cues was implied. This 
insight was reemphasized and actually enforced for Group III, which 
was required to write down its overall estimates of the factors rept 
resented by the grouped pairs. 
As described and analyzed in detail above, it was demonstrated 
that under certain conditions, people can, and do, use verbal context 
successfully to establish their model. 
RelationshiL to Real horld 
The first and most obvious comparison to be made when comparing 
laboratory experiments with those of field observations is that the 
laboratory problems generally require no professional expertise (set 
of concepts) with which the subject is to work. Most laboratory experi-
mental designs specifically engineer out any such requirement of the 
33 
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subject, and provide any necessary concepts in the conduct of the 
experiment (verbal context, or outcome feedback). The laboratory sub-
ject may of course use combination rules which he has tried and found 
useflA in some setting other than the laboratory - but this does not 
constitute professional experience. 
The results in Chapter III show that the stated hypotheses 
are strongly supported for one set of data, less clearly for another. 
Thus the phenomena seem extremely sensitive to chances in the under-
lying problem characteristics. This sensitivity is not particularly 
helpful to an attempt to extend the thesis to real life decisions. 
Follow up experiments with an examination of a broader range of prob-
lems are clearly necessary, 
Nonetheless, it was shown herein that, given the situations 
and accompanying restrictions described, conceptual structures can be 
suggested or imposed by means of an appropriate verbal construct, and 
that these conceptual structures impact on the degree of success in a 
complex structured, multiple cue inference task. 
ExtensiopandExpapaipn 
.Despite the modest dimensions of the present e :Fort, it is felt 
that the field of inquiry into the study of comple x -structured tasks 
versus that of siocle underlying variable, has been opened. Obviously, 
replication and altered replication of this experiment should be made 
to firmly establish this area of the problem space, immediately there-
after, the exploration of the range of available models and other ele- 
ments ef the inferential base and their relationship (already begun by 
Miklausich and Rose, as previously noted), should be continued and 
expanded. 
Another area deserving of attention is the study of teaching 
as providing a conceptual framework for learning (tested by the rate 
of learning). 
When we understand the adareqate complex-structured task 
study, we may understand the relationship between the laboratory and 
the real world, 
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